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Abstract
We present a low-level speciﬁcation language used for describing real Internet security protocols.
Speciﬁcations are automatically generated by a compiler, from TLA-based high-level descriptions
of the protocols. The results are rule-based programs containing all the information needed for
either implementing the protocols, or verifying some security properties. This approach has already
been applied to several well-known Internet security protocols, and the generated programs have
been successfully used for ﬁnding some attacks.
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1 Introduction
Internet is becoming everyday a more widely used medium for electronic com-
merce. This development is hampered by the natural insecurity of commu-
nications, as it is not possible to guarantee that some data exchanged is not
listened by someone else, or even that it really originated from the claimed
sender. This lack of security leads to the development of security protocols,
that is small messages sequences, after which the author provides some prop-
erties to the user, such as the correct identiﬁcation of the users (called agents)
and the privacy of some data pieces.
1 This work was partially funded by the Information Society Technologies programme of
the European Commission, Future and Emerging Technologies under the IST-2001-39252
AVISPA project, and the RNTL 03V360 Prouve´ project.
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There has been a signiﬁcant amount of work toward the speciﬁcation of
security protocols in the recent years [25,1,19,7,21,13]. However, a large part of
this work, including our own, is applied only to toy protocols in the Alice&Bob
notation, i.e. as a linear scenario describing the messages exchanged.
Our main goal is to successfully handle complex protocols such as those
under discussion at the IETF [20]. To this end, a new High-Level Proto-
col Speciﬁcation Language (HLPSL) was developed in the AVISPA project,
having in mind the constructions often found in the speciﬁcation of these pro-
tocols [9]. We have written a compiler transforming a protocol speciﬁcation
in this language to a set of rewrite rules. We present in this article not the
compiler itself, but the encoding of high-level properties in rewrite rules. We
believe that rule-based systems are a natural framework to encode the prop-
erties encountered when studying cryptographic protocols.
We do not discuss in this paper about veriﬁcation methods. For more infor-
mation concerning them, see [14,11] for instance.
This paper is organized as follows: we ﬁrst describe shortly the high-
level speciﬁcation language (Section 2); in Section 3, we describe how the
initial speciﬁcation is translated into a rule-based program, corresponding to
a low-level speciﬁcation; then, we list the examples of real Internet security
protocols that have already been successfully compiled (Section 4), their rule-
based speciﬁcation being used by several veriﬁcation tools. In the conclusion,
we compare our compiler with the MuCAPSL-MuCIL translator [15], based
on the powerful language MuCAPSL [22].
2 Specifying Protocols and Intruder
In this section, we ﬁrst present our objectives concerning protocols speciﬁca-
tions, recalling what should be the properties of speciﬁcation languages. Such
objectives are achieved by the use of two languages: a high-level language that
we describe shortly (see [9] for a complete description and semantics), to be
used by protocol designers; and a low-level language (described in a further
section) to be used by engineers.
2.1 Speciﬁcation Languages
Studying security protocols is a very important domain nowadays. This is
often done in a three steps process. First, protocols are speciﬁed in a high-
level, easily understandable language. Then, this speciﬁcation is analyzed to
ensure that there are no trivial errors. If no ﬂaws are found, the protocol is
veriﬁed in a time-consuming last step. We are interested in this paper in the
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translation from the high-level language used in the ﬁrst step to a language
suitable for analysis.
A lot of high-level speciﬁcation languages have been deﬁned, some very
simple (such as those based on the Alice&Bob notation [7,21]) and some ded-
icated to a speciﬁc tool [19,25]. But all of them either have a very limited
expressiveness, or need a high level of expertise, or both.
Our aim in studying security protocols is based on the following objectives
concerning the speciﬁcation language: we want to consider real Internet pro-
tocols and to deﬁne a language that can be used by industrials; this language
has to be able to express many security properties and has to have a clear
semantics; in addition, it has to provide a basis for automated analysis.
These objectives are motivated by the fact that protocols speciﬁcations
have to be used as documentations: in general, protocols are described in
long documents (for example provided by the IETF); this makes them diﬃ-
cult to understand, and may lead to diﬀerent interpretations according to the
objectives of the reader (to implement the protocol, to verify it, or simply
to understand it). Moreover, the underlying scientiﬁc foundations have to be
clear in a protocol speciﬁcation. This is very important for knowing if the
protocol is easy to implement or not.
For summing up, the requirements for a high-level protocol speciﬁcation
language are:
• Simplicity and comprehension: speciﬁcations have to be easy to write, to
read and to understand.
• Flexibility: a modiﬁcation in the protocol should not mean to rewrite the
whole speciﬁcation.
• Non-ambiguity: the semantics of the language should be clear enough for
avoiding ambiguous interpretations.
• Modularity: a speciﬁcation has to be modular; this permits to share some
modules between several protocols, and possibly to hide some parts of the
protocol.
• Expressiveness: this is the most diﬃcult criteria to satisfy; it can be decom-
posed into the following points:
· Control ﬂow: the language has to provide some primitives for controlling
the reception and emission of messages, to describe a negotiation phase,
for instance.
· Knowledge of the intruder and agents: the user has to be able to manage
the knowledge of the participants to the protocol, and that of the intruder.
· Cryptographic primitives: the language has to permit the use of fresh in-
formation, such as nonces (numbers used once) or keys, of hash functions,
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and also of signatures.
· Complex initial states: sometimes, protocols do not start from scratch,
and assume that some preliminary actions have already been done; so the
language has to permit the use of complex initial states.
· Complex message types: in most languages messages are generally built
with simple primitives, such as encryption, decryption, pairing, but some
more complex data structures may be needed for describing internal data
structures or messages of roles (e.g. sets, lists, records).
· Algebraic properties: in some protocols, the mechanisms for encryption
and decryption or for creating keys is details and involves the use of al-
gebraic operators, such as exclusive-or or exponentiation; such operators
have to be recognized by the speciﬁcation language, because they satisfy
some properties that may be considered for implementing the protocols.
Because none of the existing languages satisﬁes all these crucial require-
ments, we have decided, with our partners of the AVISPA project (Siemens
AG Mu¨nich, DIST Genova and ETH Zu¨rich), to deﬁne a new speciﬁcation
language.
2.2 An Expressive Speciﬁcation Language
We will illustrate our new speciﬁcation language [9] with the well-known Need-
ham and Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) protocol. This example is usually
considered as very simple and far away from real protocols. But the version
that can be seen in most papers is a simpliﬁed one. Our aim being to consider
all the options that may rise during the execution of a protocol, we will con-
sider a more complex variant of the NSPK protocol: the NSPK Key Server
(NSPK-KS). This protocol is given as follows, using an Alice&Bob-based no-
tation:
if A does not know KB,
A → S : A,B
S → A : {B,KB}K−1S
A → B : {NA, A}KB
if B does not know KA,
B → S : B,A
S → B : {A,KA}K−1S
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B → A : {NA, NB}KA
A → B : {NB}KB
The main originality of this protocol is that agents A and B, needing to know
the public key of each other for running NSPK, can ask it to a server S if
they do not already have it. This means that some steps of the protocol are
conditional.
Such a protocol is impossible to specify in other high-level dedicated pro-
tocol speciﬁcation languages, because none of them permits to easily deﬁne
such guarded transitions.
2.2.1 Modular speciﬁcation using roles.
Our speciﬁcation language is modular: protocols are not given as a sequence
of messages, but as a set of roles. There are basic roles, each one representing
the behavior of one agent in the protocol. There are also composed roles,
representing the composition of other roles or their instantiations to be con-
sidered.
Informally, basic roles correspond to an Alice&Bob description with control;
composed roles correspond to the use of CSP-like operators.
In our example, there are three basic roles: Alice, initiator of the protocol
and named A; Bob, responder, named B; and Server, S.
Each role is an independent process, with external information given as
parameter, and a local environment.
role Server(S: agent, Ks: public key,
KeyMap: (agent.public key) set,
SND,RCV: channel (dy)) played by S def=
local A: agent, B: agent, Kb: public key
knowledge(S) = { inv(Ks) }
transition
step. RCV(A’.B’) /\ in(B’.Kb’, KeyMap)
=|> SND({B’.Kb’}inv(Ks))
end role
The local environment is given by a list of local variables, and a list of
knowledge (for example, S knows the inverse of the public key Ks, i.e. the
corresponding private key).
The messages are exchanged via channels (SND and RCV), parameterized
by their level of security that corresponds to the model of the intruder to be
used for them: dy stands for the standard Dolev-Yao model [17] (no speciﬁc
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protection); ota stands for the over-the-air model (no diverted message). For
a role, there may be several channels for sending and receiving messages, de-
pending on their security level and on the concerned agents.
Composed roles are used for describing how to combine roles: this is pos-
sible to run roles in parallel or in sequence. For example, in the following
NSPK role, Alice and Bob roles are run in parallel, and in as many instances
as required. The Server role does not appear in this composed role because
there will be only one, and it will be launched in another composed role, in
parallel with NSPK.
role NSPK(SC, RC, S SRV, R SRV: agent −> channel,
Ks: public key,
Instances: (agent.agent.public key.public key) set,
KeySet: agent −> (agent.public key) set) def=
composition
/\ { in(A.B.Ka.Kb, Instances) }
Alice(A,B,Ka,Ks,KeySet(A),SC(A),RC(A),S SRV(A),R SRV(A))
/\ Bob(A,B,Kb,Ks,KeySet(B),SC(B),RC(B),S SRV(B),R SRV(B))
end role
2.2.2 Control ﬂow: guarded transitions.
The main part of a role is the description of a transition system. Its originality
is that transitions are not ordered: they are of the form condition =|> action,
where condition and action are multisets of facts; a transition can be applied
as soon as its condition is satisﬁed. So, in a role, several transitions can be
applicable at the same time.
We illustrate the use of guarded transitions with the role Alice.
role Alice(A,B: agent, Ka,Ks: public key,
KeyRing: (agent.public key) set,
SND B,RCV B,SND S,RCV S: channel (dy)) played by A def=
local State: nat, Na: text(fresh), Nb: text, Kb: public key
init State = 0
knowledge(A) = { inv(Ka) }
transition
step1a. State = 0
/\ in(B’.Kb’, KeyRing)
/\ RCV B(start)
=|> State’ = 2
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/\ SND B({Na’.A}Kb’)
step1b. State = 0
/\ not(in(B.Kb’,KeyRing))
/\ RCV B(start)
=|> State’ = 1
/\ SND S(A.B)
step2. State = 1
/\ RCV S({B.Kb’}inv(Ks))
=|> State’ = 2
/\ KeyRing’ = cons(B.Kb’,KeyRing)
/\ SND B({Na’.A}Kb’)
step3. State = 2
/\ RCV B({Na.Nb’}Ka)
=|> State’ = 3
/\ SND B({Nb’}Kb)
end role
The condition can contain comparisons, Boolean expressions over lists or
sets, messages receptions. The action can contain messages sendings, assign-
ments of variables.
A transition is a change of state, primed variables representing the values of
the variables in the next state. So primed variables can be assigned in the
right-hand side of transitions. However, if the new value of a variable is learned
in the left-hand side of a transition (in a received message, in a comparison,
or in a set expression, for examples), then its primed name is used (see for
example step0 of role Server).
The deﬁnition of roles is based on a rich type system. Many types are
available for describing protocols: agent, channel, text, message, public key,
symmetric key, Boolean, integer, hash function, enumeration. Some variables
of these types may be “fresh”, i.e. their value is generated at running time;
this happens when the primed variable appears only in the right-hand side of
a transition, not assigned.
This is also possible to use type constructors: function, pair, list, set. And
some algebraic operators can be used for representing cryptography properties:
xor, exp.
2.2.3 Veriﬁcation of properties.
In the speciﬁcation, this is possible to precise a goal section, indicating a list
of properties to be checked. The supported properties are:
• secrecy: some information (keys, nonces, messages,. . . ) have to remain
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secret, i.e. an intruder should not get this information;
• authentication: two roles identify each other w.r.t. an information that they
send to each other; this property exists in two versions: weak authentication
and strong authentication, the second one proposing a protection against
the replay of a protocol.
These properties are kinds of macros, without the need to add some informa-
tion in the transitions of roles.
This is however possible to specify LTL formulas that will not be interpreted
by the compiler, and to add some user-deﬁned facts in the transitions that
will be carried by the compiler.
A more complete description of this high-level language and of its semantics
as TLA formulas is given in [9].
3 Towards a Rule-based Program
Speciﬁcations of protocols are compiled into a rule-based program. During
this compilation phase, the syntax and the semantics of the initial speciﬁcation
are veriﬁed. If some goals are speciﬁed, the compiler can either generate one
program containing all the properties to be checked, or it can generate one
program for each goal.
The generated program contains basically three parts: rules describing the
intruder’s behavior; rules describing role transitions and compositions 2 ; the
initial state, describing the instances to be considered of the protocol.
All this information is divided in several ﬁles: a prelude ﬁle containing
all the protocol independent information, and at least one protocol speciﬁc
ﬁle. These ﬁles represent a complete and detailed low-level speciﬁcation of
the initial protocol, where all variables and constants are typed: this is a
rule-based program, a rule being of the form:
step rule name (list of variables involved) :=
left hand side & constraints => right hand side
The left-hand side and right-hand side of a rule are multisets of terms. So,
the multiset constructor ’.’ is associative and commutative. This permits to
handle the non-determinism when matching the current state of the protocol
against the left-hand side of a rule. This also permits to consider the run in
parallel of several instances of the protocol [21].
2 Note that currently we only consider parallel compositions; sequential compositions are
accepted in the hight-level speciﬁcations, but not yet converted into rules.
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Some rules may be constrained: a conjunction of constraints (seperated by
’&’) is attached at the end of the left-hand side of a rule. The constraints
that are considered are comparisons (equalities, disequalities, inequalities) and
negations of terms, that is terms that should not be matched.
3.1 General Information
The prelude ﬁle contains all the general information necessary for obtaining a
self-contained program. This information is divided into several sections that
we are going to describe.
3.1.1 Type symbols.
The list of type names is given in this section.
section typeSymbols:
agent, text, symmetric key, public key, function, table,
message, fact, nat, set, protocol id
3.1.2 Signature.
This section contains the subtyping information; for example, agents, keys
and nonces are subtypes of messages.
section signature:
message > agent
message > nonce
message > symmetric key
message > public key
In addition, each primitive used for constructing messages is declared, such
as:
pair : message ∗ message −> message
crypt : message ∗ message −> message
scrypt : message ∗ message −> message
inv : message −> message
apply : message ∗ message −> message
corresponding to pair construction, asymmetric and symmetric encryption
of a message with a key, key inverse (this is a notation, not an applicable
algorithm), and function application to a message.
More advanced primitives are also declared, such as intruder’s knowledge,
belonging constraints, and goal facts:
iknows : message −> fact
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contains : message ∗ message −> fact
secret : message ∗ agent −> fact
witness : agent ∗ agent ∗ protocol id ∗ message −> fact
3.1.3 Declaration of variables.
The type of each variable used in this prelude ﬁle (see the following sections)
is declared in this section.
section types:
F,K,M,M1,M2,M3 : message
Note that all of them are declared of type message for sake of generality. For
example, K is used as a key, but in case of symmetric encryption it could be
a compound message.
3.1.4 Equational properties.
Protocols speciﬁcations are often based on some hypotheses over the message
construction or the cryptography. This section permits to list the equational
properties considered. For example, messages are built by concatenating sub-
messages, forming tuples. But for a more simple representation in the rules,
tuples will be represented by pairing; this choice is correct if pairing is asso-
ciative.
Another example concerns the keys used for encrypting messages: given a
public (resp. private) key k, its corresponding private (resp. public) key is
denoted inv(k); a consequence is that the inverse of the inverse of a key is the
key itself.
section equations:
pair(M1,pair(M2,M3)) = pair(pair(M1,M2),M3)
inv(inv(K)) = K
For some protocols, the perfect cryptography hypothesis 3 is relaxed by
describing how to generate some keys using the Diﬃe-Hellman exponentia-
tion [23,10],
exp(exp(M1,M2),M3) = exp(exp(M1,M3),M2)
exp(exp(M1,M2),einv(M2)) = M1
or by describing the encryption mechanism using exclusive-or.
xor(M1,xor(M2,M3)) = xor(xor(M1,M2),M3)
xor(M1,M2) = xor(M2,M1)
3 An encrypted message can only be decrypted by the adequate key.
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xor(M,M) = 0
xor(0,M) = M
3.1.5 Intruder model.
The intruder is described by a set of messages that it knows and by rules
over this set. We describe the behavior of an intruder, following the standard
Dolev-Yao model [17], independently of the protocol considered. This general
behavior is ﬁrst the ability to generate messages from its knowledge:
section intruder:
step gen pair (M1,M2) :=
iknows(M1).iknows(M2) => iknows(pair(M1,M2))
step gen crypt (M1,M2) :=
iknows(K).iknows(M) => iknows(crypt(K,M))
step gen scrypt (M1,M2) :=
iknows(K).iknows(M) => iknows(scrypt(K,M))
step gen apply (M1,M2) :=
iknows(F).iknows(M) => iknows(apply(F,M))
The intruder may also analyze messages in its knowledge, for trying to get
new information by decomposing them, if possible:
step ana pair (M1,M2) :=
iknows(pair(M1,M2)) => iknows(M1).iknows(M2)
step ana crypt (K,M) :=
iknows(crypt(K,M)).iknows(inv(K)) => iknows(M)
step ana scrypt (K,M) :=
iknows(scrypt(K,M)).iknows(K) => iknows(M)
Finally, the intruder is able to generate fresh information. This is described
by the following rule, where the left-hand side is empty, the right-hand side
corresponds to the addition of a message M in the intruder’s knowledge, and
the arrow of the rule contains the information that M has to be generated at
running time: its value has to be an unused value of the type of M.
step generate (M) :=
=[exists M]=> iknows(M)
All this information in independent of the protocol to be considered. This
independence guarantees an objective and general description of the intruder’s
behavior.
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3.2 Protocol Information
We describe in this section how a high-level speciﬁcation is translated into a
rule-based program, and illustrate it with the NSPK-KS protocol.
The high-level speciﬁcation of a protocol is mainly a list of roles of two
kinds: basic roles, each one representing the behavior of a participant; com-
posed roles, describing the environment of the basic roles, i.e. how to compose
them and which instantiations to consider.
In the resulting program, a basic role, which is initially presented as a
module, is then considered as a state. The environment roles will permit us
to generate initial role states; the transitions in a basic role will describe how
to change the state of that role.
What was the local environment of a basic role becomes a list of parameters
of the state.
However, in the current version of the compiler, only one kind of channels
is considered: channel on which the Dolev-Yao model of the intruder is ap-
plied. So, for avoiding useless complex notation in the generated rules, all sent
messages are directly added to the knowledge of the intruder (iknows(. . . )).
3.2.1 Signature.
The generated program contains a section with the signature of each role state
primitive, representing the internal data structure of the role. Note that the
ﬁrst argument of a role state is the name of its player. This information may
be useful for tools that have to use this program, in particular if they want to
manage the knowledge of the agents.
section signature:
state Bob: agent * agent * public key * public key * (agent.public key) set
* nat * text * text * public key * nat −> fact
state Alice: agent * agent * public key * public key * (agent.public key) set
* nat * text * text * public key * nat −> fact
state Server: agent * public key * (agent.public key) set * agent * agent
* public key * nat −> fact
In those role states, natural numbers are used as labels for distinguishing
steps, and they are also used for ensuring the uniqueness of agents.
3.2.2 Declarations.
Then, all the variables and constants used in the program are declared. Note
that, as in the high-level language, variables always start with a capital letter,
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and constants with a small letter or with a digit.
section types:
nb, na : protocol id
kb, ka, ks, ki, Ka, Kb, Ks, Dummy Ka, Dummy Kb, dummy pk : public key
CID, CID2, CID1, State, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 : nat
Nb, Na, Dummy Nb, Dummy Na, dummy nonce : text
MGoal, start : message
AGoal, b, a, s, A, B, S, i, Dummy B, Dummy A, dummy agent : agent
KeyMap, KeyRing : (agent.public key) set
local 62, local 89, local 104, local 111 : set
3.2.3 Initialization.
The initialization of the protocol is put in a speciﬁc section. It contains
the initial states of basic roles, obtained by ﬂattening the composed roles;
note that some parameters of those states correspond to variables that were
declared locally (and not initialized) in the roles, so they are initialized with
speciﬁc constants (dummy ...). The knowledge of the intruder is also initialized
in this section, using the knowledge declared for it in the composed roles, and
the knowledge necessary for playing its assigned roles in the instantiations.
The start message is also put in the intruder’s knowledge.
A state of the protocol is a set of roles states and the set of knowledge of the
intruder.
Note that in the generated program, the intruder is never assigned as player of
a state role. This is due to the Dolev-Yao intruder model: each message sent
by an agent is directly added to the knowledge of the intruder; so, an agent
gets a message by taking it in the intruder’s knowledge; and as the intruder is
able to decompose and compose messages, it can build messages it is supposed
to build when playing a honest role.
section inits:
initial state init1 :=
contains(pair(i,ki),local 62).iknows(local 62).
iknows(ki).iknows(inv(ki)).
iknows(ks).iknows(a).iknows(i).
iknows(start).
state Server(s,ks,local 89,dummy agent,dummy agent,dummy pk,2).
state Alice(a,b,ka,ks,local 104,0,dummy nonce,dummy nonce,dummy pk,4).
state Bob(b,a,kb,ks,local 111,0,dummy nonce,dummy nonce,dummy pk,5).
state Alice(a,i,ka,ks,local 104,0,dummy nonce,dummy nonce,dummy pk,6).
contains(pair(a,ka),local 89).contains(pair(b,kb),local 89).
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contains(pair(i,ki),local 89).
contains(pair(a,ka),local 104).
contains(pair(b,kb),local 111)
The initial state is therefore a term corresponding to the set of the initial
role states and the set of the intruder’s initial knowledge.
In the example given above, only constants are used. However, in the high-
level speciﬁcation, variables can be used for describing that some information
is shared by several role states. For example, a will play twice the role Alice,
and a variable could have been used for storing its key set. The translation
of this in the initialization section would have been to used only one constant
instead of local 104 and local 116.
3.2.4 Rules.
The main section of the generated program is the section of rules. Each rule
correspond to a state transition for one of the basic roles. For example, in
NSPK-KS, the server has only one possible transition:
section rules:
step step 0 (S,Ks,KeyMap,Dummy A,Dummy B,Dummy Kb,A,B,Kb,CID) :=
state Server(S,Ks,KeyMap,Dummy A,Dummy B,Dummy Kb,CID).
iknows(pair(A,B)).
contains(pair(B,Kb),KeyMap)
=>
state Server(S,Ks,KeyMap,A,B,Kb,CID).
iknows(crypt(inv(Ks),pair(B,Kb))).
contains(pair(B,Kb),KeyMap)
In each rule, the left-hand side contains the general pattern of the role
state and the facts representing conditions for ﬁring the transition; the awaited
message has to be in the intruder’s knowledge. After automatic diversion, the
reply is immediately put into the intruder’s knowledge. So, in the right-hand
side, there is the new role state plus some facts describing new knowledge for
the intruder or the modiﬁcation of the value of a complex variable (a set, for
example).
The translation of step1b and step2 of role Alice generates the following
two rules:
step step 2 (A,B,Ka,Ks,KeyRing,Na,Nb,Dummy Kb,CID) :=
state Alice(A,B,Ka,Ks,KeyRing,0,Na,Nb,Dummy Kb,CID).
iknows(start)
& not(contains(pair(B,Kb),KeyRing))
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=>
state Alice(A,B,Ka,Ks,KeyRing,1,Na,Nb,Dummy Kb,CID).
iknows(pair(A,B))
step step 3 (A,B,Ka,Ks,KeyRing,Dummy Na,Nb,Dummy Kb,Na,Kb,CID) :=
state Alice(A,B,Ka,Ks,KeyRing,1,Dummy Na,Nb,Dummy Kb,CID).
iknows(crypt(inv(Ks),pair(B,Kb)))
=[exists Na]=>
state Alice(A,B,Ka,Ks,KeyRing,2,Na,Nb,Kb,CID).
iknows(crypt(Kb,pair(Na,A))).
contains(pair(B,Kb),KeyRing).
secret(Na,A).secret(Na,B)
In the last one, the nonce Na has to be created at running time (this is
a fresh information). The notation =[exists Na]=> means that a fresh value
will have to be generated each time that this rule is applied.
In that rule, there are also terms for indicating that Na is supposed to remain
secret, only shared by agents A and B. This information has been added be-
cause the secrecy of Na has been required as goal property in the high-level
speciﬁcation.
In both transitions, the old state contains some variables named Dummy Kb,
for example. Such variables capture the old value of the corresponding vari-
able (e.g. Kb) when either a new value will be assigned in the new state (e.g.
in step 3), or when the name of this variable has to be used in the transition
without considering its value (e.g. in step 2).
3.2.5 Goals.
The last section is devoted to the description of goal properties. For example,
if the secrecy of a term has to be checked, the goal section will be:
section goals:
goal secrecy of (MGoal,AGoal) :=
secret(MGoal,AGoal).
iknows(MGoal)
& not(secret(MGoal,i))
This description means that the secrecy property is not satisﬁed if a message
MGoal, declared as a secret shared by agent AGoal, is in the intruder’s knowl-
edge, and with the constraint that the intruder (whose name is i) does not
share oﬃcially this secret.
Similar goals are automatically generated for describing authentication
properties.
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4 Use of the Resulting Rule-based Programs
In this section, we list some of the protocols that we have already been able to
analyze with our compiler. We also cite the tools that are using the generated
rule-based programs for trying to ﬁnd some attacks.
Note that in this paper, we have not illustrated our compiler with one of the
industrial security protocols cited in the following because most of them are
complex, involving many roles. The NSPK-KS protocol has the advantage of
being based on a protocol known by everybody, but this variant is an excellent
example for illustrating the importance of the environment of each agent, and
of the control that has to be set.
We also do not list the standard toy protocols of the Clark-Jacob library [12];
they can of course be considered by our compiler.
4.1 Already Handled Protocols
In order to assess the compilation process, we have built a list of protocols
from various sources. The aim here is to demonstrate that our compiler is able
to handle a wide variety of protocols, known as important in diﬀerent areas.
We have selected both low-level protocols, such as TLS, as well as high-level
ones, such as UMTS-AKA. There are also protocols already recommended by
the IETF as well as protocols still under work.
To handle these protocols does not mean just to be able to specify them
in our high-level language. What we have detailed in the previous sections is
that we have deﬁned a methodology for analyzing such speciﬁcations and for
translating them into low-level speciﬁcations. All the subsequently given pro-
tocols have been automatically compiled, their speciﬁcation being as verbatim
as possible from their informal deﬁnition.
Core security mechanism [6].
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [16]. This two-part protocol aims at pro-
viding low-level privacy and data integrity. We have currently modeled and
compiled the TLS record protocol.
Useful but not core mechanism [6].
Kerberos, ChapV2. The ﬁrst one is well-spread and well-known. ChapV2 is
an extension by Microsoft of the CHAP protocol used for PPP authentication.
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Authentication mechanism for the Internet.
In the survey [24], several protocols were recommended for authentication
with password over the Internet. Among these, we have already analyzed the
protocols EKE, EKE2, SPEKE and the SRP protocols. Among them, the
*EKE protocol family is a family of zero-knowledge protocols for authenti-
cation on a password. We have also successfully analyzed the UMTS-AKA
(Authentication and Key Agreement UMTS) protocol. The SRP protocol was
designed by Siemens and presented at the IETF.
Protocols under development.
We also work, in conjunction with Siemens, on the analysis of protocols
under development. Among these, we have already analyzed the AAA Mo-
bileIP protocol, which is a sub-protocol of Mobile IP. See [18] for a description
of the protocol its goal. Note that the Mobile IP protocol is a collection of
protocols in development since 1998. We hope to contribute to this develop-
ment by speeding up part of its analysis. We have also analyzed the IKEv2
main protocol.
Other sources.
Finally, we have considered protocols from diﬀerent sources, such as the
ISO/IEC public key protocols. We have also analyzed the two party signature
RSA protocol [5].
4.2 Verifying the Rule-based Programs
The programs that have been generated for the protocols listed in the previous
section have been studied by several tools:
• OFMC [4]: an on-the-ﬂy model checker developed at ETH, Zu¨rich;
• SATMC [3]: a SAT-based model checker developed at DIST, Genova;
• CL-Atse [26]: a constraint logic-based protocol analyzer developed at LO-
RIA, Nancy.
The ﬁrst results obtained are still preliminary ones, but some attacks have
been found on several protocols, some of them being new ones (see [9]).
This connection of three very diﬀerent tools, done for the AVISPA project,
demonstrates the ﬂexibility and expressiveness of the rule-based speciﬁcations
of protocols that we generate automatically.
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5 Conclusion
We have presented in this paper a low-level framework for expressing protocol
speciﬁcations. The security protocols are initially described with a simple,
ﬂexible, modular, non-ambiguous and expressive high-level language [9]. The
generated speciﬁcations are rule-based programs with very detailed informa-
tion: a full typing of variables, constants and primitives; a precise description
of role transitions and of the initial state; the independent description of the
intruder’s model.
The generated rules permit to consider both the parallelism of the agents,
and the non-determinism when applying a rule [21].
The compiler described is written in OCaml and documented with OCaml-
Web (140 pages). It has been deﬁned for the AVISPA project, for considering
real industrial Internet security protocols. The ﬁrst experiments generate very
good results, so we are going to continue its development for being able to han-
dle even more protocols. This is a considerable improvement compared to the
ﬁrst compiler that was realized for the AVISS project [2], where only simple
protocols could be considered [12].
The other languages that try to go beyond the Alice&Bob notation without
getting too complicated are rare. For example, the MSR cryptoprotocol speci-
ﬁcation language [8] uses also the notion of roles, but it is a very mathematical
language, inaccessible to most engineers and protocol designers.
The only other known successful attempt in deﬁning a clear high-level
language is the MuCAPSL-MuCil translator [15]. Initial speciﬁcations are
written in MuCAPSL [22], a new version of the CAPSL language [7] dedi-
cated to the speciﬁcation of group communication protocols. While CAPSL
was an Alice&Bob notation language, MuCAPSL is completely diﬀerent: it is
based on roles, and provides a large scale of primitives and data structures;
each role is typed (a type contains some attributes, functions, . . . ) and con-
tains a sequence of instructions, including DO. . . UNTIL loops.
Comparing MuCAPSL with our speciﬁcation language, this is clear that Mu-
CAPSL oﬀers many more data structures, primitives and instructions. How-
ever, it is unclear how to specify that some roles share some information,
or how many instances of a role are created, since there is no environment
role and roles do not have parameters. In addition, with our language, the
transitions are guarded and are not ordered: their application is not deter-
ministic, and transitions can be applied several times if possible; this is not
the case with MuCAPSL. So, this is not clear how the example given in this
paper, NSPK Key Server, could be speciﬁed in MuCAPSL. About properties
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to check, MuCAPSL, like our language, proposes secrecy and authentication.
The MuCAPSL-MuCIL translator generates a speciﬁcation in MuCIL that
contains the declaration of the used symbols, and a multiset of conditional
rewriting rules.
For concluding, MuCAPSL-MuCIL and our compiler have both their own
advantages, and if our speciﬁcation language is more simple, this is because
we have designed it with the objective to provide it to industrial partners. It
is powerful enough for specifying rather easily most of the Internet security
protocols. And the aim of our compiler is to provide rule-based speciﬁcations
of protocols to industrials for helping them to implement the protocols that
they design, and also for verifying those protocols, by plugging any kind of
veriﬁcation tool, as it has already been done with AVISPA for three very
diﬀerent tools.
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